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Abstract
We consider stable sets of a simple and symmetric strategic public
good provision game. In particular, we consider stable sets where
each one consists of strategy proles that provide an identical level
of the public good. We completely identify the public good provision
levels to be supported by the stable sets for each number of players.
This identication induces the following two observations. First, the
ecient public good provision level is always supported by a stable
set. Second, the public good provision levels at the stable sets are no
lower than that at the (unique coalition-proof) Nash equilibrium. In
fact, the stable sets support strictly higher public good provision levels
than that at the Nash equilibrium if there are more than two players.
Further, we give a welfare comparison between the stable sets and the
Nash equilibrium by employing the coecient of resource utilization.
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1 Introduction
Game theory includes two contrasting conclusions for a public good provi-
sion problem. In the cooperative framework, the players can agree upon the
ecient outcomes in the sense that the core is generally nonempty. In fact,
the core is large and the unique stable set. (See Champsaur, 1975.) On the
other hand, in the noncooperative framework, the players generally fail to
agree upon the ecient outcome in the sense that the Nash equilibrium is
inecient. Indeed, the public good is underprovided at the Nash equilib-
rium. The underprovision and the resulting ineciency are main concerns in
the noncooperative public good provision game. At least interpretationally,
the cooperative and the noncooperative games are distinguished whether the
binding agreement is allowed or not.1 In the absence of the binding agree-
ment, the players can unilaterally deviate from an outcome, leaving the other
players' strategies unchanged in the noncooperative framework. This paper
explores the possibility of more ecient outcomes to be agreed upon without
the binding agreement.
To this end, we employ the coalitional contingent threat situation, hence-
forth CCTS, that is dened by Greenberg (1990) in his book. The CCTS is
derived from a strategic form game and describes the following open nego-
tiation among the players. Once a strategy prole is proposed, a coalition
of players may openly declare to deviate from the strategy prole by chang-
ing their own strategies, provided that the other players stick to the current
strategies. Other players come to know this deviation by the open declara-
tion. Then, another coalition can counter to this deviation by declaring to
revise their own strategies from the new strategy prole. The possibility of
such a counter deviation is the feature of the CCTS that varies from the stan-
1See Aumann (1974) for this kind of arguments.
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dard strategic form game analysis with the Nash equilibrium and its variants
such as the strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) and the coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, et al., 1987).2
The solution concept for the CCTS is given by the stability notion a la
von Neumann and Morgernstern (1944), and will be called the stable set in
this paper.3 Namely, the stable set in the CCTS is a set of strategy proles
satisfying the internal and external stability. It can be roughly described as
follows. Consider that a stable set and a strategy prole in the stable set
are proposed. According to the manner of the CCTS, a coalition of players
may declare to revise the strategy prole to make themselves better o.
The internal stability requires that the revised strategy prole be outside the
stable set. Then, this strategy revision will be countered by another coalition
by the external stability. Namely, the coalition will benecially declare to
change their strategies so that the new strategy prole is in the stable set.
In this way, the players voluntarily maintain the stable set as an agreement
without a binding agreement once the players have accepted the stable set.
We consider the stable sets in a CCTS derived from a strategic public good
provision game. The two players case was investigated by Miyakawa (2006).
This paper extends his model for an arbitrary nite number of players. Okada
and Muto (1998) investigated the stable sets in the symmetric duopoly model,
which is technically related to our model. They showed the existence of some
complicated stable sets though there were only two players. To avoid such
a diculty, we restrict our attention to one particular class of the stable
sets: we consider a class of stable sets, each of which is consisting of strategy
2The coalition-proof Nash equilibrium takes a subsequent deviation into account, but
it is limited to the deviation by a subcoalition of the deviating coalition.
3Originally, the solution concepts in the the theory of social situations are dened as the
optimistic stable standard of behavior and the conservative stable standard of behavior,
which coincide with each other in the CCTS.
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proles that achieve an identical level of the public good provision. In other
words, we consider the range of public good provision levels to be supported
by stable sets.
The main purpose of this paper is the complete identication of the public
good provision levels to be supported by stable sets. We derive the following
observations from this identication. First, the ecient public good provision
level is supported by a stable set. Second, the underprovision at the stable
sets are no worse than that at the Nash equilibrium, and better than that
at the Nash equilibrium when there are more than two players. Indeed, the
minimum public good provision level supported by a stable set is close to
two thirds of the ecient outcomes, which slightly varies according to the
number of players.
The rst observation shows that the players can voluntarily maintain the
agreement on the ecient public good provision without a binding agreement.
The eciency of the stable set was investigated in some related models in the
literature. Okada and Muto (1998) showed that the set of ecient outcomes
is a stable set in a Cournot duopoly market, which is technically related to
our model. Later, Miyakawa (2006) showed that the ecient provision level
is supported by a two-player public good provision game. Therefore, the
rst observation is an extension of his result for an arbitrary nite number
of players. Further, Nakanishi (2001) showed the existence of the stable set
with an ecient outcome in a n-player prisoners' dilemma with continuous
strategy spaces where only individual declarations of changing strategies are
allowed. Hirai (2013) showed that the stable set exists if and only if the
strong Nash equilibrium exists in a binary choice model of the public good
provision game. Moreover, the stable set coincides with the set of strong
Nash equilibria if it exists, and thus the stable set is ecient whenever it
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exists.
In spite of the rst observation, there may exist other inecient stable sets
since multiple stable sets exist in general. The second observation indicates
that the stable sets are better than the Nash equilibrium in the sense of the
extent of the underprovision. However, each stable set includes a strategy
prole where at least one player prefers the Nash equilibrium to it. Therefore,
we cannot conclude that the stable sets are more ecient than the Nash
equilibrium with respect to the Pareto criterion. Instead, we employ the
concept of the coecient of resource utilization due to Debreu (1951). Then,
we show that the strategy proles included in one stable set has the common
coecient of resource utilization, and our stable sets are at least as ecient
as the Nash equilibrium with respect to the coecient of resource utilization.
Indeed, the stable sets are strictly more ecient than the Nash equilibrium
when there are more than two players.
At the end of this section, we review some literature that investigated the
stable set and its variants in the public good provision problem. In the stan-
dard coalitional form game of a public good provision problem, Champsaur
(1975) showed that the core is the unique stable set. The analogy for the
continuum of players was shown by Einy and Shitovitz (1995) by employing
a dierent framework from the CCTS in the theory of social situation. Fur-
ther, Shitovitz and Weber (1997) considered the stable set in the continuum
players public good provision problem with nite types, where any feasible
allocations have the equal-treatment property and a certain crowding eect
presents. They showed that the set of equal-treatment Lindahl equilibrium
allocations is the unique stable set as well as the core. Hirai (2008) showed
the existence and characterized the stable sets in a public good economy with
proportional income tax due to Guesnerie and Oddou (1981). These liter-
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ature at least implicitly assumed the possibility of the binding agreements,
while the present paper does not.
In the next section, we dene the strategic form game of the public good
provision problem. In Section 3, we dene the stable set and give a charac-
terization of it. We also state our main results that completely identify the
public good provision levels being supported by stable sets. The proofs of
the results in this section are relegated to the Appendix. In Section 4, we
compare the extents of the underprovision and the ineciency of the stable
set with those of the Nash equilibrium. In the nal section, we conclude with
some remarks.
2 The public good provision game
For a nite set A, we denote jAj the cardinality of A. For any pair of real
numbers a and b with a < b, we denote [a; b] = fx 2 Rja  x  bg,
]a; b[= fx 2 Rja < x < bg, [a; b[= fx 2 Rja  x < bg, and ]a; b] = fx 2
Rja < x  bg.
We consider a simple and symmetric public good provision game in the
strategic form. Let N = f1; :::; ng be the nite set of players with n  2.
A nonempty subset of N is called a coalition. Let N denote the set of
coalitions. Each player is endowed with an identical amount ! 2 R++ of the
private good.
Each i 2 N chooses xi 2 [0; !] that he contributes for the public good
provision. The set of strategies for each i 2 N is denoted by Xi = [0; !]. For
each S 2 N , we denote XS = i2SXi and x (T ) =
P
i2T xi for any coalition
T  S and xS 2 XS. The private good contributed from the players is
transformed to the public good by a linear production technology with unit
cost 1. Thus, the set of the feasible (public good) provision level is [0; n!].
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For each y 2 [0; n!], we denote X (y) = fx 2 XN jx (N) = yg. Each i 2 N
has the identical simple preferences relation on XN that is represented by
the payo function vi (x) = (!   xi)
P
i2N xi for any x 2 XN .
In a public good provision game, x 2 XN is said to be ecient if there
exists no x0 2 XN such that vi (x0)  vi (x) for all i 2 N and a strict inequality
holds for at least one player. It is easy to see that if x (N) = n!
2
, then x is
ecient. Therefore, we call n!
2
the ecient provision level.4
3 The stable set
We introduce the stable set in a strategic form game due to Greenberg (1990).
Originally, the stable set is dened as the optimistic (conservative) stable
standard of behavior, henceforth OSSB (CSSB) for a CCTS, which coincides
with each other in the CCTS. We omit to derive the CCTS and directly
dene the stable set in a strategic form game. Of course, the stable set in
a strategic form game and the OSSB (CSSB) for a CCTS are essentially
equivalent.
The stable set in the strategic form game inherits the spirit of von Neu-
mann and Morgernstern (1944): The stable set is a set of strategy proles
such that its elements do not dominate each other (the internal stability)
and any strategy prole outside the set is dominated by some strategy pro-
le in the set (the external stability). To dene the dominance relation in
the strategic form game, we begin with the denition of the inducibility.
Denition 1 For any x; x0 2 XN and S 2 N , we say x is inducible from x0
via S, denoted by x0 !S x, i xNnS = x0NnS.
4To be precise, there generally exists an ecient x 2 XN with x (N) > n!2 . For
example, x = (0; !; :::; !) is ecient whereas x (N) > n!2 when n  3. The term \ecient
provision level" is used just for simplifying the arguments.
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Then, the dominance relation is dened as follows.
Denition 2 For any x; x0 2 XN and S 2 N , we say x dominates x0 via S,
denoted by x S x0, i x0 !S x and vi (x) > vi (x0) for all i 2 S. For any
x; x0 2 XN , we say x dominates x0, denoted by x  x0 i x dominates x0 via
some S 2 N .
A strategy prole x is dominated via a coalition when the members of the
coalition can make themselves better o by changing their own strategies
only. Now, we dene the stable set.
Denition 3 We say K  XN is a stable set i K satises the following
two properties.
Internal stability: For any x; x0 2 K, x  x0 does not hold.
External stability: For any x 2 XN n K, there exists some x0 2 K such
that x0  x.
In general, there are multiple stable sets, and some of those may be very
complicated. To simplify the argument, we restrict our attention whether a
feasible provision level is supported by a stable set. Formally, we investigate
whether X (y) is a stable set for each y 2 [0; n!]. We call y 2 [0; n!] is a
stable provision level i X (y) is a stable set. The simplicity of our model
allows the following characterization of the stable provision level.
Proposition 1 Let y 2 [0; n!]. Then, y is a stable provision level if and
only if if y  n!
2
, and for any y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X(y0), there exists some
S 2 N that satises
x0 (S) > jSj!   y; (1)
x0 (S)  y0   y; (2)
!y > (!   x0i) y0 for all i 2 S: (3)
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Moreover, if jSj = 1, then (1) and (2) imply (3).
The proof of Proposition 1 will be given in Appendix A.1.
Then, we state the main results of this paper. Employing the charac-
terization of Proposition 1, we identify the feasible provision levels to be
supported by the stable sets.
Theorem 1 Assume that n = 2. Then, X (y) is a stable set if and only if
y 2 2!
3
; !

.
Theorem 2 Assume that n  3.
(a) When n = 3k for some k 2 N, X (y) is a stable set if and only if
y 2
hn!
3
;
n!
2
i
:
(b) When n = 3k + 1 for some k 2 N, X (y) is a stable set if and only if
y 2
" p
9n2   6n  3  n+ 1!
6
;
n!
2
#
:
(c) When n = 3k + 2 for some k 2 N, X (y) is a stable set if and only if
y 2
" p
9n2 + 6n  3  n  1!
6
;
n!
2
#
:
The proofs of Theorem 1 and 2 will be also given in Appendix A.2 and A.3,
respectively.
We obtain two corollaries from Theorem 1 and 2. The rst one extends
one of the results of Miyakawa (2006) for the number of players.
Corollary 1 The ecient provision level is stable.
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Figure 1: The UPRs of the stable provision levels.
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The second corollary assures the existence of the stable set since any
interval in Theorem 1 and 2 has a positive length. Note that the stable set
may fail to exist in general. See Hirai (2013) for an example with no stable
set, which is a binary choice version of the present model.
Corollary 2 There exist innitely many stable sets.
Figure 1 summarizes the results of Therem 1 and 2 in terms of the under-
provision rate, henceforth UPR. The UPR at a feasible provision level y  n!
2
is dened as 2y
n!
that is the ratio of y to the ecient provision level.5 Each
thick vertical line represents the range of the stable provision levels in terms
of the UPR at each number of players. Note that the UPRs at the minimum
stable provision levels vary according to the number of players, but they are
close to 2
3
.
5In our symmetric model, the UPR essentially turns out to be the index of easy rid-
ing due to Cornes and Sandler (1984). They remarked that the index of easy riding is
inappropriate to measure the extent of ineciency. See also Cornes and Sander (1996,
pp.159-161).
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Remark 1 In Theorem 2, the formulas of the minimum stable provision
levels vary according to the remainder of n divided by 3. Indeed, as is
obvious from Figure 1, the minimum stable provision level is lower than but
close to n!
3
when n is not a multiple of 3. This uctuation is caused by a
certain integer problem.
Given a feasible provision level y  n!
2
, we will later construct a strategy
prole that is most dicult to be dominated by some strategy prole in
X(y) to check whether X(y) is a stable set. To this end, imagine tentatively
the model where the set of players is the continuum with measure n, while
the initial endowments and the payo functions are left unchanged. In the
proof of Theorem 2, we will construct the strategy prole for each feasible
provision level y as follows: n
3
players contribute all of their endowments,
and the remaining players contribute suciently small amount so that they
do not satisfy (3) in Proposition 1, which is in fact determined endogenously.
Such a strategy prole is ideal \ideal" in the sense that we are constructing
this in the model with continuum of players. Then, X(y) includes a strategy
prole that dominates this ideal one whenever y is no less than n!
3
, which
implies that n!
3
is the minimum stable provision level.
Returning to the original model with nite players, such an ideal strategy
prole can be directly applied when n is a multiple of 3. Therefore, n!
3
is
the minimum stable provision level in this case. On the other hand, the
ideal strategy prole is not feasible when n
3
is not an integer. Then, given a
feasible provision level y, we need to nd an \approximately ideal" strategy
prole that is most dicult to be dominated by some strategy prole in
X(y) among the feasible strategy proles. This approximately ideal strategy
prole is certainly departed from the ideal one constructed in the imaginary
model with continuum of players. This departure makes the approximately
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ideal strategy prole slightly easier to be dominated by some strategy prole
in X(y) for a given y. Then, X(y) where y is slightly lower than n!
3
includes a
strategy prole that dominates the approximately ideal strategy prole when
n is not a multiple of 3, and thus slightly lower provision levels than n!
3
can
be supported by a stable set. See the proofs in Appendix A.3 for more detail,
in particular Lemma 9.
Additionally, note that the UPR of the minimum stable provision level
converges to 2
3
, which is the UPR at y = n!
3
, as n goes to innity. This
comes from the fact that the approximately ideal strategy prole converges
to the ideal one constructed in the imaginary model as the number of players
increases. 
Remark 2 When n = 2, the approximately ideal strategy prole considered
in Remark 1 is so far from the ideal strategy prole that it is no longer the
most dicult to be dominated among the feasible strategy proles. There-
fore, we need to consider another strategy prole not to be dominated for
identifying the minimum stable provision level when n = 2. This makes the
case with n = 2 distinct from the others, and thus an independent proof is
necessary. 
4 Comparison with the Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium is the most popular solution in the strategic public
good provision game. In our simple model, it is easy to see that
x =

!
n+ 1
; :::;
!
n+ 1

2 XN
is the unique Nash equilibrium. We call n!
n+1
the Nash provision level. In
fact, it seems consistent to our model that we regard x the coalition-proof
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Nash equilibrium that is robust to not only the individual deviations, but
also the credible coalitional deviations since we are allowing the players to
form a coalition when we consider the stable set. It is also easy to check that
x is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. See for example Yi (1999).
We compare the stable provision levels with the Nash provision level,
and observe that any stable provision level is strictly higher than the Nash
provision level when n  3.
Proposition 2 Any stable provision level is at least as high as the Nash
provision level. Moreover, if n  3, then any stable provision level is strictly
higher than the Nash provision level.
Proof. The case with n = 2 is obvious by Theorem 1. We show the case
with n  3 by employing Theorem 2.
First, assume that n = 3k for some k 2 N. Then, by n  3,
n!
3
  n!
n+ 1
=
n (n  2)
3 (n+ 1)
> 0;
the desired inequality.
Second, assume that n = 3k + 1 for some k 2 N. Then, by n  4, p
9n2   6n  3  n+ 1!
6
  n!
n+ 1
=
 
(n+ 1)
 p
9n2   6n  3  n+ 1  6n!
6 (n+ 1)
>
 
(n+ 1)
 p
9n2   12n+ 4  n+ 1  6n!
6 (n+ 1)
=
((n+ 1) (2n  1)  6n)!
6 (n+ 1)
=
(2n2   5n  1)!
6 (n+ 1)
> 0;
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the desired inequality.
Finally, assume that n = 3k + 2 for some k 2 N. Then, by n  5, p
9n2 + 6n  3  n  1!
6
  n!
n+ 1
=
 
(n+ 1)
 p
9n2 + 6n  3  n  1  6n!
6 (n+ 1)
>
 
(n+ 1)
 p
4n2 + 4n+ 1  n  1  6n!
6 (n+ 1)
=
(n (n+ 1)  6n)!
6 (n+ 1)
=
(n2   5n)!
6 (n+ 1)
 0;
the desired inequality. 
Though the stable provision level is almost always higher than the Nash
provision level, each stable set includes a strategy prole that is not com-
parable with the Nash equilibrium with respect to the Pareto criterion. For
example, consider the case where n = 2m for some m 2 N and a strategy
prole x where xi = ! for all i = 1; :::;m and xi = 0 for all i = m+1; :::; 2m.
It is easy to see that x is in the stable setX (m!), which supports the ecient
provision level. However, players 1; :::;m prefer the Nash equilibrium to x,
while players m+1; :::; 2m prefer x to the Nash equilibrium. We can consider
a similar example for the case with lower stable provision level and/or odd n.
Therefore, the Pareto criterion is not appropriate to compare the eciency
at the stable sets with that at the Nash equilibrium. Instead, we apply the
coecient of resource utilization due to Debreu (1951) for the measurement
of the eciency.
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Denition 4 Let x 2 XN . The coecient of resource utilization, henceforth
CRU, at x is dened as  (x) = W (x)
n!
, where
W (x) = min
(X
i2N
ri + q
 riq  ui (x) for all i 2 N ;ri  ! for all i 2 N
)
The CRU at x is the ratio of the minimum amount of the (private good re-
quired for attaining the payos (u1 (x) ; :::; un (x)) to the the original amount
of the initial endowments n!. Note that the condition ri  ! for all i 2 N is
added for the consistency with our model in which each player is not allowed
to consume the private good more than !.
The following proposition conrms that the stable set is more ecient
than the Nash equilibrium with respect to CRU.
Proposition 3 For any y 2 0; n!
2

and x 2 X(y),  (x) = 2
p
(n! y)y
n!
.
Therefore, for any stable provision level y and any x 2 X (y),  (x)   (x),
where x 2 X is the Nash equilibrium, and the strict inequality holds if n  3.
Proof. We prove the rst statement. Then, the remaining proof follows
from Proposition 2 since
2
p
(n! y)y
n!
is increasing in y with 0  y  n!
2
.
It is easy to see that if xi = 0 for all i 2 N , then x 2 X(0) and (x) = 0.
Fix an arbitrary y 2 0; n!
2

and an arbitrary x 2 X (y). Dene
ri =
(!   xi) yp
(n!   y) y for all i 2 N and q =
p
(n!   y) y:
For all i 2 N ,
!   ri = !
p
(n!   y) y   (!   xi) yp
(n!   y) y 
!
p
(n!   y) y   y

p
(n!   y) y
by xi  0. Suppose that
p
(n!   y) y < y. Then, n!   y < y by y > 0,
contradicting that y  n!
2
. Thus, !  ri for all i 2 N . It is easy to see
15
that riq = (!   xi) y = vi (x) for all i 2 N . Hence, W (x) 
P
i2N ri + q =
2
p
(n!   y) y.
Fix arbitrary r01; :::; r
0
n  ! and q0 with r0iq0  (!   xi) y for all i 2 N .
Dene W 0 =
P
i2N r
0
i + q
0. Note that
P
i2N r
0
iq
0  (n!   y) y. On the other
hand, (W 0   p) p is maximized at p = W 0
2
. Thus,
W 02
4
 (W 0   q0) q0 =
X
i2N
r0iq
0  (n!   y) y
that is equivalent to W 0  2p(n!   y) y. Hence W (x) = 2p(n!   y) y and
(x) = W (x)
n!
. 
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigated a certain class of the stable sets in a strategic public
good provision game. We completely identied the range of the feasible
provision levels to be supported by stable sets. Then, we observed that the
ecient provision level is supported by a stable set. We also observed that
the stable sets are better than the Nash equilibrium in terms of the extent of
the underprovision and the coecient of resource utilization. We conclude
with a remark.
Our results heavily depend on the simplicity and the symmetry of the
model. It seems dicult to characterize the stable provision levels in a general
model. Perhaps, there may not exist a stable set consisting of strategy proles
achieving an identical level of the public good provision. Instead, we may
work with the general model by restricting our attention to whether a set
of the ecient strategy proles is a stable set. Another direction of the
extension is to consider a model with asymmetric initial endowments while
the preferences remain symmetric. Such a model was employed by Shitovitz
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and Spiegel (1998). We may investigate whether the neutrality theorem like
Bergstom, et al. (1986) holds, or the inequality of the initial endowments
aects the range of the stable provision levels. We remain these problems for
future research.
Appendix
We give the proofs for Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 and 2.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst prove four lemmas. Then, we turn to the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 For any y 2 [0; n!], X (y) is internally stable.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary y 2 [0; n!]. Fix arbitrary x; x0 2 X (y) and S 2 N
such that x!S x0. By x (N) = x0 (N) = y, there exists some j 2 S such that
xj  x0j. Then, x0 S x is impossible by vj (x0) =
 
!   x0j

y  (!   xj) y =
vj (x). 
Lemma 2 For any y 2]n!
2
; n!], X (y) is not externally stable.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary y 2 n!
2
; n!

. Fix an arbitrary x 2 X  n!
2

.
Note that x is Pareto ecient. Suppose that there exist some S 2 N
and xS 2 XS such that (xS; xNnS) S x and (xS; xNnS) 2 X (y). Then,
vi(xS; x

NnS) > vi (x
) for all i 2 S. For all i 2 N n S, vi(xS; xNnS) =
(!i   xi ) y  (!i   xi ) n!2 = vi (x) by y > n!2 . This contradicts the Pareto
eciency of x. Hence no x 2 X (y) dominates x, andX (y) is not externally
stable. 
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Lemma 3 Let y 2 0; n!
2

and y0 2 [0; y[. For any x0 2 X (y0), there exists
some x 2 X (y) such that x  x0.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary y 2 0; n!
2

. Fix an arbitrary y0 2 [0; y[ and an
arbitrary x0 2 X (y0). Note that (n!   y0) y0 < (n!   y) y since (n!   z) z is
a quadratic concave function of z maximized at z = n!
2
and y0 < y  n!
2
. Let
S = fi 2 N jx0i < !g and s = jSj. Note that s! x0 (S) = n! x0 (N) = n! 
y0 since x0i = ! for all i 2 N n S. For each i 2 S, there uniquely exists some
x00i 2]x0i; !] such that (!   x0i) y0 = (!   x00i ) y by 0  (!   x0i) y0 < (!   x0i) y.
Since
(n!   (x00 (S) + (n  s)!)) y = (s!   x00 (S)) y
= (s!   x0 (S)) y0
= (n!   y0) y0
< (n!   y) y;
we have
y   (n  s)! < x00 (S) : (A.1)
Dene xi =
x00i
x00(S) (y   (n  s)!) for each i 2 S. Then, x (S) = y  
(n  s)! and 0  xi < x00i  ! for all i 2 S by (A.1). We have (xS; x0NnS) 2
X (y) since x0i = ! for all i 2 N n S. By xi < x00i for all i 2 S, vi (x0) =
(!   x0i) y0 = (!   x00i ) y < (!   xi) y = vi(xS; x0NnS) for all i 2 S. Hence
(xS; x
0
NnS) S x0. 
Lemma 4 Let y; y0 2 [0; n!] with y < y0 and x0 2 X (y0). Then, there exists
some x 2 X (y) such that x S x0 if and only if there exists some S 2 N
that satises (1)-(3) in Proposition 1.
Proof. Fix arbitrary y; y0 2 [0; n!] with y < y0 and an arbitrary x0 2 X (y0).
Let S 2 N and s = jSj. We rst rewrite (1) and (2) in the following way.
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We have
(s!   x0 (S)) y0  (s!   (y   x0 (N n S))) y
= (s!   x0 (S)) y0   (s!   (y   y0 + x0 (S))) y
= s! (y0   y)  (y0   y)x0 (S)  (y0   y) y
= (y0   y) (s!   x0 (S)  y) :
By y0   y > 0, (1) holds if and only if
(s!   x0 (S)) y0 < (s!   (y   x0 (N n S))) y: (A.2)
Also, y   x0 (N n S) = y   y0 + x0 (S). Thus, (2) holds if and only if
y   x0 (N n S)  0. (A.3)
Next, we show the necessity. Assume that there exists some x 2 X (y)
such that x S x0. By x 2 X (y) and x0 !S x,
x (S) = y   x0 (N n S) : (A.4)
By vi (x) > vi (x
0) for all i 2 S, (!   x0i) y0 = vi (x0) < vi (x) = (!   xi) y for
all i 2 S. Aggregating these inequalities over S,
(s!   x0 (S)) y0 < (s!   x (S)) y: (A.5)
Substituting (A.4) to (A.5), we obtain (1) as well as (A.2). By (A.4) and
x (S)  0, we obtain (2) as well as (A.3). By xi  0 for all i 2 S, (!   x0i) y0 <
(!   xi) y  !y for all i 2 S. Thus, we obtain (3).
Finally, we show the suciency. Assume that (1)-(3) hold. Note that
(A.2) and (A.3) hold as well. For each i 2 S, there exists some gi 2]0; !]
such that (!   gi) y = (!   x0i) y0 by (3). Aggregating these equations over
S, (s!   g (S)) y = (s!   x0 (S)) y0. Then, by (A.2) and (A.3),
g (S) > y   x0 (N n S)  0: (A.6)
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For each i 2 S, dene xi = gig(S) (y   x0 (N n S)). Then, x (S) = y x0 (N n S)
and 0  xi < gi for all i 2 S by gi > 0 for all i 2 S and (A.6). Thus,
x0 !S (xS; x0NnS), (xS; x0NnS) 2 X (y), and
vi
 
xS; x
0
NnS

= (!   xi) y > (!   gi) y = (!   x0i) y0 = vi (x0)
for all i 2 S. Hence (xS; x0NnS) S x0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let y 2 [0; n!]. First, we show the suciency.
Assume that y  n!
2
and y satises (1)-(3) for any y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X(y0).
Then, the internal stability follows from Lemma 1, and the external stability
follows from Lemma 3 and 4. Hence X(y) is a stable set.
Next, we show the necessity. Assume that X(y) is a stable set. Then,
Lemma 2 implies y  n!
2
, and Lemma 4 implies that y satises (1)-(3) for
any y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X(y0).
Finally, we show that (1) and (2) imply (3) if jSj = 1. Fix an arbitrary
y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X(y0). Denote S = fig. Assume that S satises (1)
and (2). Recall that (1) is equivalent to (A.2), and (2) is equivalent to (A.3).
Then, together with jSj = 1,
(!   x0i) y0 < (!   (y   x0 (N n fig))) y  !y:
Thus, we obtain (3). 
Proposition 1 plays an important role in the subsequent proofs of Theorem
1 and 2.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Let n = 2. We rst prove the necessity. Assume
that X (y) is a stable set. It suces to show that y  2!
3
by Proposition 1.
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Suppose that y < 2!
3
. Consider a strategy prole x0 satisfying x0i =
2!
3
for
i = 1; 2. Thus, x0 (f1; 2g) = 4!
3
.
For each i = 1; 2, 4!
3
  y > 2!
3
= xi by y <
2!
3
. Thus, neither f1g nor
f2g satises (2) in Proposition 1. Hence for each i = 1; 2, there exists no
x 2 X (y) such that x fig x0. Further, f1; 2g does not satisfy (1) since
2!   y > 4!
3
= x0 (f1; 2g)
by y < 2!
3
. Thus, there neither exists x 2 X (y) such that x f1;2g x0. Hence
X (y) is not externally stable.
Next, we turn to the suciency. Fix an arbitrary y 2 2!
3
; !

. Fix an
arbitrary x0 2 XN such that x01+x02 > y. Denote y0 = x01+x02. By Proposition
1, it suces to prove that some S 2 N satises (1)-(3) for these y0 and x0.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Both x01 > y and x
0
2 > y.
We prove that N = f1; 2g satises all (1)-(3) in Proposition 1. By x0i >
y  2!
3
for each i = 1; 2, x0 (N) > 2y  2!   y. Thus, N satises (1). By
y > 0, x0 (N) = y0 > y0  y. Thus, N satises (2). Since x0i > y  2!3 for each
i = 1; 2 and y0  2!, !y  2!2
3
 !y0
3
> (!   x0i) y0 for each i = 1; 2. Thus,
N satises (3).
Case 2. Either x01  y or x02  y.
We consider the case where x01  x02. The case where x01 < x02 can be
proved by a similar argument.
In this case, x02  y and x01  y
0
2
hold. Thus, x01 >
!
3
by y0 > y  2!
3
.
We show that f1g satises (1)-(3) in Proposition 1. By y  2!
3
and x01 >
!
3
,
x01 >
!
3
 !   y. Thus, f1g satises (1). By x02  y, x01 = y0   x02  y0   y.
Thus, f1g satises (2). Since jf1gj = 1, f1g satises (3) by the last statement
of Proposition 1.
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By Proposition 1 and Case 1 and 2, X (y) is a stable set. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We rst prove ve lemmas. Then, we turn to the proof of Theorem 2.
In what follows, for each s 2 f1; :::; ng and any x 2 XN , let S (x; s)
denote the coalition such that jS (x; s) j = s and xi  xj for any i 2 S (x; s)
and j =2 S (x; s). Of course, there may be multiple coalitions satisfying
these conditions. In such a case, we can choose one coalition according to an
arbitrary rule. Note that for any y 2 [0; y], x 2 X(y), and s 2 f1; :::; ng,
x (S (x; s))  s
n
y: (A.7)
Suppose that there exist some y 2 [0; n!], x 2 X (y), and s 2 f1; :::; ng
such that x (S (x; s)) < s
n
y. By the denition of S (x; s), xi <
y
n
for all
i =2 S(x; s). Thus, x (N) < y, contradicting that x 2 X (y). Hence (A.7)
holds.
Lemma 5 Let y; y0 2 [0; n![ with y < y0 and s 2 f1; :::; ng. Then, S(x0; s)
satises both (1) and (2) in Proposition 1 for any x0 2 X(y0) if and only if
n

1  y
y0

 s < y
!   (y0=n) : (A.8)
Proof. Let y; y0 2 [0; n![ with y < y0 and s 2 f1; :::; ng. For any x0 2 X(y0),
x0 (S (x0; s))  s
n
y0 for any x0 2 X (y0) and the equality holds if x0i = y
0
n
for
all i 2 N by (A.7). Thus, S(x0; s) satises (1) for any x0 2 X(y0) if and only
if
0 <
s
n
y0   (s!   y) = s

y0
n
  !

+ y:
This is equivalent to the latter inequality of (A.8) since

y0
n
  !

< 0 by
y0 < n!. On the other hand, S (x0; s) satises (2) for any x0 2 X (y0) if and
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only if
s
n
y0  y0   y:
This is equivalent to
s  n  y
y0
n = n

1  y
y0

by y0 > 0. Thus, we obtain the former inequality of (A.8). 
Lemma 6 If (n+1)!
4
 y  n!
2
, then for any y0 2]y; n![, there exists some
s 2 f1; :::; ng such that S (x0; s) satises (1) and (2) in Proposition 1 for
any x0 2 X(y0).
Proof. Let y 2
h
(n+1)!
4
; n!
2
i
.
We claim that
y
!   (y0=n)

  n

1  y
y0

 1 for any y0 2]y; n![: (A.9)
We can transform (A.9) as
ny

1
n!   y0  
1
y
+
1
y0

 1 for any y0 2]y; n![:
Dierentiating the LHS of (A.9) by y0,
ny

1
(n!   y0)2  
1
y02

=
ny
(n!   y0)2 y02

y02   (n!   y0)2

=
ny
(n!   y0)2 y02 (n! (2y
0   n!))8><>:
< 0 if y0 < n!
2
= 0 if y0 = n!
2
> 0 if y0 > n!
2
:
Thus, the LHS of (A.9) is minimized at y0 = n!
2
. Therefore, (A.9) is satised
for any y0 2]y; n![ since
ny

1
n!   y0  
1
y
+
1
y0

 ny

2
n!
  1
y
+
2
n!

=
4y
!
  n  1;
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where the last inequality follows from y  (n+1)!
4
.
Then, for any y0 2]y; n![, there exists some integer s (y0) 2 f1; :::; ng such
that
n

1  y
y0

 s (y0) < y
!   (y0=n)
by (A.9) and 0 < n

1  y
y0

< n. By Lemma 5, for any y0 2]y; n![,
S (x0; s (y0)) satises (1) and (2) in Proposition 1 for any x0 2 X (y0). 
Hereafter, dene T (y; x0) =
n
i 2 N
x0i > ! 1  yy0o and t(y; x0) =
jT (y; x0)j for any y 2 0; n!
2

, y0 2]y; n!], and x0 2 X (y0).
Lemma 7 Let y 2 0; n!
2

. Then, T (y; x0) is nonempty for any y0 2]y; n!]
and x0 2 X (y0) if and only if y > n!
4
.
Proof. Let y 2 0; n!
2

. We claim that T (y; x0) 6= ; for any y0 2]y; n!] and
any x0 2 X (y0) if and only if
n!

1  y
y0

< y0 for any y0 2]y; n!]: (A.10)
We rst show the contraposition of the necessity. Assume that there
exists some ~y 2]y; n!] such that n!

1  y
~y

 ~y. Then,   ~y
n
; :::; ~y
n
 2 X (~y)
and T 
 
y;
 
~y
n
; :::; ~y
n

= ; by !

1  y
~y

 ~y
n
.
Next, we show the contraposition of the suciency. Assume that there
exist some y 2]y; n!] and x 2 X (y) such that T (y; x) = ;. Then, xi 
!

1  y
y

for all i 2 N . Thus, y = x (N)  n!

1  y
y

.
It remains to show that (A.10) holds if and only if y > n!
4
. By y0 > 0,
(A.10) is equivalent to
y02   n!y0 + n!y > 0 for any y0 2]y; n!]: (A.11)
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The LHS of (A.11) is a quadratic convex function of y0 that is minimized at
y0 = n!
2
. Thus, (A.11) holds if and only if n!y  n2!2
4
> 0. This is equivalent
to y > n!
4
. 
Proposition 1 and Lemma 7 show that any X (y) with y  n!
4
cannot be
a stable set because it is not externally stable.
Lemma 8 Let y 2 0; n!
2

. If y > n!
4
, then T (y; x0) satises (1) in Propo-
sition 1 for any y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X (y0) with t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

.
Proof. Fix arbitrary y 2 n!
4
; n!
2

and y0 2]y; n!]. Fix an arbitrary x0 2
X (y0) such that t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

.
By the denition of T (y; x0), y0 = x0 (N) = x0 (T (y; x0))+x0 (N n (T (y; x0))) 
x0 (T (y; x0)) + (n  t)!

1  y
y0

that is equivalent to x0 (T (y; x0))  y0  
(n  t(y; x0))!

1  y
y0

. Thus, it suces to show that
y0   (n  t(y; x0))!

1  y
y0

  (t!   y) > 0: (A.12)
By t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

and y0 > 0,
LHS of (A.12) = y + y0   n! + (n  t(y; x0)) !y
y0
> y + y0   n! +

n  n

1  y
y0

!y
y0
= y + y0   n! + n!y
2
y02
= y + y0   n!
y02
 
y02   y2
= (y + y0)

1  n!
y02
(y0   y)

=
n! (y + y0)
y02

y   y0 + y
02
n!

:
25
By y0 > y > n!
4
, (A.12) holds if y > y0  y02
n!
. Consider a function f(z) = z  z2
n!
that is a quadratic concave function maximized at z = n!
2
. Thus,
y0   y
02
n!
 f
n!
2

=
n!
2
  n
2!2
4n!
=
n!
4
:
By y > n!
4
, y > y0   y02
n!
. 
Lemma 9 Let y 2 n!
4
; n!
2

. Then, for any y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X (y0) with
t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

, T (y; x0) satises (2) in Proposition 1 if and only if
y  h (n) where
h (n) =
8>><>>:
n!
3
if n = 3k for some k 2 N,
(
p
9n2 6n 3 n+1)!
6
if n = 3k + 1 for some k 2 N,
(
p
9n2+6n 3 n 1)!
6
if n = 3k + 2 for some k 2 N.
Moreover, for any y  h(n), there exist some y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X (y0)
such that t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

.
Proof. We begin with ve claims, where Claim 1,3-5 are equivalent trans-
formations and Claim 2 is an auxiliary claim. Throughout this proof let
y 2 n!
4
; n!
2

.
Claim 1 y satises x0 (T (y; x0))  y0   y for any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2
X (y0) with t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

if and only if y satises
y   (n  t(y; x0))!

1  y
y0

 0 (A.13)
for any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2 X (y0) with t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

.
Proof of Claim 1. Let y 2 n!
4
; n!
2

. We begin with the suciency.
Assume that (A.13) holds for any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2 X (y0) with
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t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

. For any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2 X (y0), y0 = x0 (N) =
x0 (T (y; x0)) + x0 (N n T (y; x0))  x0 (T (y; x0)) + (n  t(y; x0))!

1  y
y0

that is equivalent to
x0 (T (y; x0))  y0    (n  t(y; x0))!

1  y
y0

:
By substituting this inequality to (A.13), we obtain x0 (T (y; x0))  y0   y
for any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2 X (y0) with t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

.
Then, we turn to the necessity. Assume that x0 (T (y; x0))  y0   y for
any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2 X (y0) with t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

. Suppose
that there exist some y00 2]y; n!] and some x00 2 X (y00) with t(y; x00) <
n

1  y
y00

such that
y   (n  t(y; x00))!

1  y
y00

< 0: (A.14)
We claim that there exists some ~x 2 X (y00) such that t(y; ~x)  t(y; x00)
and ~xi = !

1  y
y00

for all i 2 N n T (y; ~x). Let ~t = minx2X(y00) t (y; x).
Note that ~t > 0 by Lemma 7 and y > n!
4
. Denote z = !

1  y
y00

. Dene
~xi =
y00 (n ~t)z
~t
for all i = 1; :::; ~t and ~xi = z for all i = ~t+ 1; :::; n.
We show that ~x 2 X(y00). By its construction, ~x(N) = y00 and 0 <
~xi < ! for all i = ~t + 1; :::; n are obvious. Moreover, ~xi > z, otherwise
T (~x) = ;, contradicting that ~t > 0. Thus, we show ~xi  ! for all i = 1; :::; ~t.
Suppose that ~xi > ! for all i = 1; :::; ~t. Then, ~t! + (n   ~t)z < ~x(N) = y00.
This contradicts the denition of ~t because more than ~t players are at least
necessary to contribute more than z to provide y00 of the public good. Hence
~xi  ! for all i = 1; :::; ~t and ~x 2 X(y00).
By the denition of z, i =2 T (~x) for all i = ~t + 1; :::; n. Then, by the
denition of ~t, T (y; ~x) = f1; :::; ~tg. Thus, t(y; ~x) = ~t  t(y; x00) and
~xi = !

1  y
y00

for all i 2 N n T (y; ~x).
27
By ~t  t(y; x00), ~x  f1; :::; ~tg = y00    n  ~t! 1  y
y00

, and (A.14),
0 > y   (n  t(y; x00))!

1  y
y00

 y    n  ~t!1  y
y00

= y + ~x(f1; :::; ~tg)  y00:
Thus, ~x
 f1; :::; ~tg < y00 y, contradicting the presumption since ~t  t(y; x00) <
n

1  y
y00

. Hence the necessity is proved. 
Dene
y0 (t; y) =
n! +
p
n2!2   4 (n  t)!y
2
for any t 2 N. Note that y0(t; y) is well dened if and only if n2!2  
4 (n  t)!y  0. Note also that y0 (t; y) is the maximum solution to the in-
equality y0 (t; y)  t!+(n  t)!

1  y
y0(t;y)

that is equivalent to y0 (t; y)2 
n!y0 (t; y) + (n  t)!y  0.
Claim 2 For any t = 1; :::; n, y0 (t; y) is well-dened if and only if there exist
some y0 2]y; n!] and x0 2 X (y0) such that t(y; x0) = t.
Proof of Claim 2. We can easily conrm the necessity by letting y0 =
y0(t; y), x0i = ! for all i = 1; :::; t, and x
0
i = !

1  y
y0(t;y)

for all i = t+1; :::; n.
We turn to the suciency.
Let t = 1; :::; n. Assume that there exist some y00 2]y; n!] and x00 2 X (y00)
such that t(y; x00) = t. By x00i  ! for all i 2 T (y; x00) and x00i  !

1  y
y00

for all i 2 N n T (y; x00), y00 = x00 (N)  t! + (n  t)!

1  y
y00

, equivalently
y002   t!y0 + (n   t)!y  0. Therefore, the inequality y02   t!y0 + (n  
t)! (1  y)  0 has a solution y0 = y00. Thus, the maximum solution is
well-dened, and it is y0 (t; y). 
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Claim 3 y satises (A.13) for any y0 2]y; n!] and any x0 2 X (y0) with
t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

if and only if y satises
y   (n  t)!

1  y
y0 (t; y)

 0 (A.15)
for any t 2 N such that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
Proof of Claim 3. We rst show the suciency. Assume that (A.15) holds
for any t 2 N such that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

. Fix
arbitrary y 2]y; n!] and x 2 X (y) such that t(y; x) < n

1  y
y

. Denote
t = t(y; x). Note that y0 (t; y) is well-dened by Claim 2. Then, t satises
(A.15) by the presumption. By y = x (N)  t! + (n  t)!

1  y
y

, y2  
n!y + (n  t)!y  0. Since y0 = y0 (t; y) is the maximum solution for the
inequality y02   n!y0 + (n  t)!y  0, y  y0 (t; y). Together with (A.15)
and t = t(y; x),
y   (n  t(y; x))!

1  y
y

 y   (n  t)!

1  y
y0 (t; y)

 0;
the desired inequality.
Next, we show the necessity. Assume that (A.13) holds for any y0 2]y; n!]
and any x0 2 X (y0) with t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

. Fix an arbitrary t^ 2 N such
that y0
 
t^; y

is well-dened and t^ < n

1  y
y0(t^;y)

. Let x^ 2 X such that
x^i = ! for all i = 1; :::; t^, and x^i = !

1  y
y0(t^;y)

for all i = t^+ 1; :::; n. By
the denition of y0
 
t^; y

, x^ 2 X  y0  t^; y. Note that t^ = t(y; x^). By (A.13),
x^ 2 X(y0(t^; y)), and t^ < n

1  y
y0(t^;y)

,
y   (n  t(y; x^))!

1  y
y0(t^; y)

 0:
Substituting t^ = t(y; x^), we obtain (A.15). 
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Claim 4 y satises (A.15) for any t 2 f1; :::; ng such that y0 (t; y) is well
dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

if and only if y satises
y 
p
t (4n  3t)  t

!
2
(A.16)
for any t 2 f1; :::; ng such that y0 (t; y) is well dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
Proof of Claim 4. Let t 2 N such that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t <
n

1  y
y0(t;y)

. By the denition of y0 (t; y), (A.15) is equivalently trans-
formed as
(y   (n  t)!)
p
n2!2   4 (n  t)!y  ! (n (n  t)!   (3n  2t) y) :
(A.17)
By t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

and y0 (t; y)  n!,
y   (n  t)! < y  

n  n

1  y
y0 (t; y)

!
= y   n!y
y0 (t; y)
 y   y
= 0:
Thus, the both sides of (A.17) are negative. Then, by squaring both sides of
(A.17),
(y   (n  t)!)2  n2!2   4 (n  t)!y  !2 (n (n  t)!   (3n  2t) y)2 :
Simplifying this inequality,
 4 (n  t)!y3   4t (n  t)!2y2 + 4t (n  t)2 !3y  0:
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By y > 0, ! > 0, and n  t > 0, we nally have y2 + t!y   t (n  t)!2  0.
Solving this inequality for y regarding with y > 0, we obtain (A.16). 
Let t 2 f1; :::; ng maximize the RHS of (A.16), and dene
y =
p
t (4n  3t)  t

!
2
:
Claim 5 Assume that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
Then, y satises (A.16) for any t 2 f1; :::; ng such that y0 (t; y) is well-dened
and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

if and only if y  y.
Proof of Claim 5. Assume that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
First, assume that y  y. For any t 2 f1; :::; ng, if y0 (t; y) is well-
dened, then y0 (t; y) is well-dened and y0 (t; y)  y0 (t; y) by the denition
of y0 (t; y). Thus, for any t 2 f1; :::; ng, if y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t <
n

1  y
y0(t;y)

, then y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

. Then,
for any t 2 f1; :::; ng such that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

,
y  y =
p
t (4n  3t)  t
2

p
t (4n  3t)  t
2
by the denitions of t and y.
Next, assume that y < y. By the denition of y0 (t; y), y0 (t; y) is well-
dened and y0(t; y) > y0(t; y) since y0 (t; y) is well-dened and y < y.
Then, t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

< n

1  y
y0(t;y)

by y < y. By the denition of
t and y,
y < y =
p
t (4n  3t)  t
2
:
Hence y does not satisfy (A.16) for t while y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t
satises t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

. 
For proving the former part of Lemma 9, it remains to prove that y =
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h(n), y0 (t; y) is well-dened, and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

by Claim 1-5. Note
that this is also sucient for the last statement of the Lemma 9 as follows.
The necessity part of the proof of Claim 5 proves that y0 (t; y) is well-dened
and t satises t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

for any y < y, provided that y0 (t; y)
is well-dened and t satises t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

. Then, for any y < y,
by dening x0i = ! for all i = 1; :::; t
 and x0i = !

1  y
y0(t;y)

for all i =
t + 1; :::; n, we have x0 2 X(y0(t; y)) and t(y; x0) = t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
To nd t, it suces to nd t that maximizes
p
t (4n  3t)   t. To this
end, we consider a function f (z) =
p
z (4n  3z)   z dened on z 2]0; n[.
Dierentiating f (z) twice,
f 0 (z) =
2n  3zp
z (4n  3z)   1;
f 00 (z) =
 z (4n  3)  (2n  3z)2
(z (4n  3z)) 32
:
By f 00 (z) < 0 for any z 2]0; n[, f (z) is a concave function that is maximized
when f 0 (z) = 0. Solving 2n   3z = pz (4n  3z) regarding with z < n, we
obtain z = n
3
.
Recall that t in (A.16) must be a natural number as it is the cardinality of
a coalition. Thus, the RHS of (A.16) is maximized at some natural number
next to n
3
. In what follows, we complete the proof by distinguishing three
cases according to the statement of Lemma 9.
(a) Let k 2 N and n = 3k. Then, n
3
= k is the natural number. Thus,
t = k and y = n!
3
.
We need to show that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
We have
y0 (t; y) =
n! +
q
n2!2   4  n  n
3

!
 
n!
3

2
=
2n!
3
:
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Therefore, y0 (t; y) is well-dened. Moreover, n

1  y
y0(t;y)

= n
2
> n
3
=
k = t, the desired inequality. Hence (a) is proved.
(b) Let k 2 N and n = 3k + 1. Thus, n
3
= k + 1
3
. Then, t = k
or k + 1 by the concavity of f (z). Thus, it suces to check the sign of
g (k) = f (k + 1)  f (k). Note that g (k) = p9k2 + 10k + 1 p9k2 + 4k  1
by n = 3k + 1. We claim that g (k) < 0. This is equivalent to
p
9k2 + 10k + 1 <
p
9k2 + 4k + 1:
Since the both sides are positive, we can equivalently transform by squaring
both sides as
9k2 + 10k + 1 < 9k2 + 4k + 1 + 2
p
9k2 + 4k
that can be simplied as 3k <
p
9k2 + 4k, the desired inequality. Thus,
t = k = n 1
3
and
y =
p
(3n2   2n  1)=3  (n  1)=3
2
=
p
9n2   6n  3  n+ 1
6
:
Note that t  n
4
by n  4 in this case.
We turn to showing that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
We have
n!
3
 
 p
9n2   6n  3  n+ 1!
6
=
!
6

3n  1 
p
9n2   6n  3

>
!
6

3n  1 
p
9n2   6n+ 1

= 0:
By n!
3
>
(
p
9n2 6n 3 n+1)!
6
= y and t = k = n 1
3
 n
4
,
n2!2   4 (n  t)!y > n2!2   4

n  n
4

!
n!
3

= 0:
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Thus, y0(t; y) is well-dened, and y0(t; y) > n!
2
by this inequality and the
denition of y0(t; y). Moreover,
n

1  y

y0 (t; y)

> n

1  n!=3
n!=2

=
n
3
>
n  1
3
= k = t;
the desired inequality. Hence (b) is proved.
(c) Let k 2 N and n = 3k + 2. Thus, n
3
= k + 2
3
. Then, t = k
or k + 1 by the concavity of f (z). Thus, it suces to check the sign of
g (k) = f (k + 1)  f (k). Note that g (k) = p9k2 + 14k + 5 p9k2 + 8k  1
by n = 3k + 2. We claim that g (k) > 0. This is equivalent to
p
9k2 + 14k + 5 >
p
9k2 + 8k + 1:
Since the both sides are positive, we can equivalently transform as
9k2 + 14k + 5 > 9k2 + 8k + 1 + 2
p
9k2 + 8k
that can be simplied as 3k + 2 >
p
9k2 + 4k. This is the desired inequality
since 3k + 2 =
p
9k2 + 12k + 4 >
p
9k2 + 4k. Thus, t = k + 1 = n+1
3
and
y =
p
(3n2 + 2n  1)=3  (n+ 1)=3
2
=
p
9n2 + 6n  3  n  1
6
:
We turn to showing that y0 (t; y) is well-dened and t < n

1  y
y0(t;y)

.
We have
n!
3
 
 p
9n2 + 6n  3  n  1!
6
=
!
6

3n+ 1 
p
9n2 + 6n  3

>
!
6

3n+ 1 
p
9n2 + 6n+ 1

= 0:
By n!
3
>
(
p
9n2+6n 3 n 1)!
6
= y and t = k + 1 = n+1
3
> n
3
,
n2!2   4 (n  t)!y > n2!2   4

n  n
3

!
n!
3

=
n2!2
9
> 0:
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Thus, y0(t; y) is well-dened, and y0(t; y) > 2n!
3
by this inequality and the
denition of y0(t; y). Moreover,
n

1  y

y0 (t; y)

> n

1  n!=3
2n!=3

=
n
2
>
n+ 1
3
= k + 1 = t
by n  5, the desired inequality. Hence (c) is proved. 
Proof of Theorem 2. The necessity follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma
7, 9. Thus, we turn to the proof of the suciency. For each n  3, let
h (n) =
8>><>>:
n!
3
if n = 3k for some k 2 N;
(
p
9n2 6n 3 n+1)!
6
if n = 3k + 1 for some k 2 N;
(
p
9n2+6n 3 n 1)!
6
if n = 3k + 2 for some k 2 N.
Fix an arbitrary y such that max
n
h (n) ; (n+1)!
4
o
 y  n!
2
. We rst prove
that X(y) is a stable set. Then, we turn to showing that h (n)  (n+1)!
4
for
all n  3.
Fix an arbitrary y0 2]y; n!] and an arbitrary x0 2 X (y0). We show that
some S 2 N satises (1)-(3) for these y0 and x0. Note that T (y; x0) 6= ; by
Lemma 7 and y > n!
4
. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1. y0 = n!.
In this case, it is obvious thatX(n!) is a singleton and x0 = (!; :::; !). We
show that N satises (1)-(3) in Proposition 1 for y0 = n! and x0 = (!; :::; !).
Since y > 0, (1) follows from x0(N) = n! > n!   y, and (2) follows from
x0(N) = n! > y0   y. Since y > 0 and x0i = ! for all i 2 N , (3) follows from
!y > 0 = (!   x0i)y0 for all i 2 N .
Case 2. y0 < n! and t(y; x0)  n

1  y
y0

.
By y  (n+1)!
4
and Lemma 6, there exists some s 2 f1; :::; ng such that
S (x0; s) satises both (1) and (2) in Proposition 1. Let s be the minimum
integer such that S (x0; s) satises both (1) and (2). By Lemma 5, s is
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the minimum integer satisfying s  n

1  y
y0

. Then, s  t(y; x0) and
S (x0; s)  T (y; x0) by the denitions of these two sets. Hence S (x0; s)
satises (1)-(3) in Proposition 1.
Case 3. y0 < n! and t(y; x0) < n

1  y
y0

.
Since y  max
n
h (n) ; (n+1)!
4
o
> n!
4
, T (y; x0) satises (1) by Lemma
8, and (2) by Lemma 9. Together with the denition of T (y; x0), T (y; x0)
satises (1)-(3).
By Case 1-3, there exists some coalition that satises (1)-(3) in Proposi-
tion 1. Hence X (y) is a stable set.
We turn to proving that h (n)  (n+1)!
4
for any n  3. It is easy to see
that n!
3
 (n+1)!
4
by n  3. Thus, we obtain the suciency of (a).
Let n = 3k + 1 for some k 2 N. It suces to show that
2
p
9n2   6n  3  5n+ 1 (A.18)
since p
9n2   6n  3  n+ 1!
6
  (n+ 1)!
4
=
 
2
p
9n2   6n  3  5n  1!
12
:
By the positivity of both sides of (A.18), it suces to show that
36n2   24n  12 =

2
p
9n2   6n  3
2
 (5n+ 1)2 = 25n2 + 10n+ 1
that can be simplied as 11n2   34n   13  0. It is easy to check that this
inequality holds for any n  4. Thus, we obtain the suciency of (b).
Let n = 3k + 2 for some k 2 N. It suces to show that
2
p
9n2 + 6n  3  5n+ 5 (A.19)
since p
9n2 + 6n  3  n  1!
6
  (n+ 1)!
4
=
 
2
p
9n2 + 6n  3  5n  5!
12
:
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By the positivity of both sides of (A.19), it suces to show that
36n2 + 24n  12 =

2
p
9n2 + 6n  3
2
 (5n+ 5)2 = 25n2 + 50n+ 25
that can be simplied as 11n2   26n   37 > 0. It is easy to check that this
inequality holds for any n  5. Thus, we obtain the suciency of (c). Hence
the suciency for each (a)-(c) is proved. 
References
Aumann, R. J. (1959) \Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person
games," in Contributions to the Theory of Games, IV, 287-324.
Aumann, R. J. (1974) \Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strate-
gies," Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67-94.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., Varian, H. (1986) \On the private provision of
public goods," Journal of Public Economics 29, 25-49.
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1
Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., Whinston, M. D. (1987) \Coalition-proof Nash
equilibria I: Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1-12.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8
Champsaur, R.J. (1975) \How to Share the Cost of a Public Good?" Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 4, 113-129.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01780629
Cornes, R., Sandler, T. (1984) \Easy riders, joint production, and public
goods," Economic Journal 94, 580-598.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2232704
Cornes, R., Sandler, T. (1996) \The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods
and Club Goods (2nd ed.)," Cambridge University Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174312
37
Debreu, G. (1951) \The coecient of resource utilization," Econometrica 19,
273-292.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1906814
Einy, E., Shitovitz, B. (1995) \The optimistic stability of the core mapping
in public goods production economies," Economic Theory 6, 523-528.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01211792
Greenberg, J. (1990) \The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative
Game-Theoretic Approach," Cambridge University Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173759
Guesnerie, R., Oddou, C. (1981) \Second-Best Taxation as a Game," Journal
of Economic Theory 25, 67-91.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90017-X
Hirai, T. (2008) \von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates
in public good economies," Economic Theory 37, 81-98.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0284-x
Hirai, T. (2013) \The stable set of the social conict game with delega-
tions: Existence, uniqueness, and eciency," Working Paper, University
of Toyama No. 279
http://hdl.handle.net/10110/10869
Miyakawa, T. (2006) \Koukyouzai no jihatsutekikyoukyuukeizai deno an-
teishugou," (\Stable sets in a voluntary contribution economy of a public
good") Osaka Keidai Ronshu 57, 67-77. (In Japanese)
Nakanishi, N. (2001) \On the existence and the eciency of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners'dilemma," Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory 30, 291-307.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820100081
Okada, D., Muto, S. (1998) \Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in
Cournot competition," Keizai to Keizaigaku (Economy and Economics)
85, 37-57.
38
Shitovitz, B., Spiegel, M. (1998) \Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in
pure public good economies," Journal of Economic Theory 83, 1-18.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2449
Shitovitz, B., Weber, S. (1997) \The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the
unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set," Journal of Math-
ematical Economics 27, 375-387.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00786-6
Yi, S.-S. (1999) \On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set
of Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior 26, 353-364.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0656
von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944) \The Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior," Princeton University Press
39
